NAFTA's investment treaty has led to several expropriation compensation claims from investors hurt by new environmental regulations. Expropriation clauses in international treaties solve post-investment moral hazard problems such as hold-ups. However, these clauses can interact with National Treatment clauses in a manner that hinders investment.
Introduction
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and multilateral investment agreements (including Chapter 11 of NAFTA, the North America Free Trade Agreement) seek to promote foreign direct investment by offering foreign investors increased security and transparency. These treaties require that hosts compensate investors in the event of expropriation or (possibly) regulatory actions that diminish the value of the investment. Foreign investors can bring their expropriation claims against the host country to an international tribunal, bypassing the host's domestic courts. The international tribunal decides whether the host's action constitutes a "regulatory taking," requiring compensation, or whether it falls within the host's "police powers carve-out" for policies designed to protect the public good, and is therefore not compensatory. The tribunal's criteria for a regulatory taking, and its standard of proof for a carve-out exemption, may differ from the host's; some policies that would be exempt from compensation under domestic law may be compensatory under the terms of the investment treaty. Thus the expropriation clause of treaties like NAFTA, together with its investor-to-state provision, gives foreign investors protection not available to domestic investors. The investment agreement therefore subjects the host to risks from international investment that do not arise with domestic investment.
In many cases, the need for regulation is known only after the investment is sunk. The existence of sunk costs combined with the fact that the host makes the regulatory decision creates an efficiency argument for the host to bear the costs of this regulation. This argument supports a narrow police powers carve-out. Contingent contracts or lump sum transfers that are made before the investment is undertaken could in principle offset the host's "regulatory risk" (defined as the risk of bearing the costs caused by regulation). For example, if the host can make the right to invest conditional on a side-payment from the investor, then the host can assure itself non-negative expected value from any project that it accepts. However practical difficulties limit the use of contingent contracts, and treaty provisions that promote non-discriminationparticularly the National Treatment and Most Favored Nation (MFN) clauses-restrict the feasibility of lump sum transfers. Thus, a narrow police powers carve-out may lead to an allocation of risk that affects both the distribution of the rents and the efficiency of foreign investments.
The National Treatment clause requires that foreign investors receive at least as good treatment as domestic investors "in like circumstances"; the MFN clause similarly guarantees investors treatment at least as good as that received by investors from any other foreign country. The international tribunal decides whether the foreign and domestic firms are indeed from non-discriminatory regulation for the public good. These contradictory rulings leave unsettled the question of how future tribunals will interpret expropriation clauses.
In this paper, we assess the efficiency, equity, and investment promotion impacts of a police powers carve-out. Since many of the NAFTA cases involve environmental regulations, our model uses an environmental setting; however the tension between expropriation and nondiscrimination clauses arises for a variety of regulatory problems. Similarly, even though our modeling choices are guided by characteristics of the legal environment created by NAFTA, our results are applicable to the many hundreds of similar bilateral and multilateral investment agreements containing expropriation and non-discrimination clauses.
The rest of this Introduction discusses the role of expropriation clauses and their relation to other parts of investment agreements. We also review relevant literature. Section 2 of the paper discusses specific cases that have come before NAFTA tribunals as well as details of investment agreements; this information validates the two-period model introduced in Section 3. That section examines the equilibrium level of regulation occurring post-investment. Section 4 studies the investment stage, where we assess the efficiency and equity of a narrow versus broad police powers carve-out. Section 5 concludes.
Expropriation clauses help a host to make a credible commitment not to expropriate foreign investors' sunk assets, thereby helping to solve the hold-up problem. Grossman and Hart (1986) provide one of the first models of the hold-up problem; recent contributions include Noldeke and Schmidt (1995) and Schmitz (2001) . Markusen (2001) discusses the costs and benefits, for developing countries seeking to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), of the credible commitment that expropriation clauses help create.
Advocates argue in favor of using investment treaties to protect investors' rights on the assumption that these treaties promote FDI. An emerging body of empirical literature, including Hallward-Driemeier (2003) , Neumayer and Spess (2005) and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2004) , finds little conclusive evidence that BITs do promote FDI. Huang (2005) provides mixed evidence concerning foreign firms' need for international protection. Compared to average domestic firms, foreign firms report lower levels of regulatory constraint, but foreign firms may be treated less well than politically connected domestic firms.
Even a host that is not tempted to expropriate the foreign investor may impose excessively strict regulations, simply because the cost of the regulations is external to the host. Reviewing the literature on Pollution Havens, Wilson (1997) labels a host's failure to internalize the cost that local regulation imposes on inward FDI as a NIMBY (Not In My Backyard) outcome; see also Levinson (1997) . From the investor's perspective, zealous regulation can be viewed as creeping expropriation or a regulatory taking. Expropriation clauses that force governments to compensate investors for costs arising from regulation can induce hosts to internalize costs, thereby eliminating excess regulation and promoting investment. Cost-internalization is the leading justification among legal scholars for the U.S. Fifth Amendment, which states that private property shall not be "taken for public purpose without just compensation" (Been and Beauvais 2003) . Cost-internalization is likely to be even more important when dealing with foreign investors, who often repatriate profits and have less domestic political leverage.
The extent of protection that the Fifth Amendment provides property owners is a matter of debate, but thus far U.S. courts have rejected the doctrine of regulatory takings (a term often associated with Epstein (1985) ). Some Chapter 11 plaintiff arguments (a few of which are summarized in the next section) appear to construe NAFTA as an endorsement of the doctrine of regulatory takings for international investments. These plaintiff arguments have prompted public complaints that the expropriation clause amounts to an end-run around U.S. and other nations' domestic law. Some observers believe regulatory takings claims such as Methanex v. U.S. are an unintended consequence of the expropriation clause. Daniel Price, the lead U.S. Chapter 11 negotiator, rejects this view, stating "The parties did not stumble into this [interpretation] ....This was a carefully crafted definition" (quoted from Greider (2001) ); see also Price (2000) . The legal community is still debating whether the NAFTA case history validates fears that NAFTA establishes a regulatory takings doctrine; see Tschen (1999) , Soloway (2002) , Gaines (2002) , Alvarez and Park (2003) and Turk (2005) .
The main argument in favor of a narrow police powers carve-out is that it promotes investment. However, a narrow carve-out may lead to excessive investment. Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro (1984) point out that court acceptance of the doctrine of regulatory taking provides investors free insurance against the loss induced by condemnation, thereby possibly leading to excessive investment. If international tribunals accept the doctrine of regulatory taking by adopting a narrow police powers carve-out, while domestic courts continue to reject the doctrine of regulatory taking, foreign firms implicitly receive subsidized insurance that is denied to domestic investors.
We show that a narrow police powers carve-out may also hinder investment. A narrow police powers carve-out transfers regulatory risk to the host, reducing the host's expected payoff from investment. If the carve-out is very narrow, the host's expected payoff may be negative and the host will want to reject some projects outright. Most investment treaties contain only weak rights of establishment, allowing the host to reject undesirable projects (Vandevelde 1998) .
Under these treaties, a narrow carve-out may compel the host to prohibit investment in risky sectors, even though the investment may increase global welfare.
Some agreements like NAFTA, though, guarantee stronger rights to invest. We show that under a narrow police powers carve-out, agreements with strong rights to invest may cause a host to receive more foreign investment, but benefit less. For this type of investment agreement, a broader carve-out can increase the host's expected benefit from FDI, and may be desirable on distributional grounds.
Background and institutional context
This section provides detail about NAFTA's expropriation clause, some NAFTA investor-tostate cases, and NAFTA features that might limit efficient first-stage bargaining between hosts and investors.
Expropriation and Chapter 11
NAFTA's Article 1110 governs expropriation and compensation. This article states:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"), except: 2. Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation took place ("date of expropriation"), and shall not reflect any change in value occurring because the intended expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation criteria shall include going concern value, asset value including declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair market value.
This article appears to state that even if the host's actions are for a public purpose, nondiscriminatory, and in accordance with due process, they are still subject to compensation requirements.
To date twenty seven publicly reported compensation claims have been filed under this clause. These claims are arbitrated by either the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) or United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-TRAL). Below we describe three of these claims, focusing on those features that guide our modeling choices in Section 3.
Non-discrimination rules
Like many other investment agreements, Chapter 11 specifies minimum treatment standards, areas in which this treatment must be afforded, and exceptions to the treatment standards.
NAFTA's National Treatment standard is more comprehensive than most BITs. Article 1102: National Treatment states Each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments.
The second paragraph is identical, with the phrase "to investors" replaced by "to investments of investors". Article 1103: Most-Favored-Nation Treatment is identical to the first two paragraphs of Article 1102 with the phrase "to its own investors" replaced by the phrase "to investors of any other Party or of a non-Party".
Articles 1102 and 1103 state that the host's equitable treatment obligations begin even before ground is broken for a new project, since the non-discrimination rules apply during establishment and acquisition. Thus, the rules prevent the host nation from demanding that foreigners pay up-front transfers in order to secure the right to invest.
Annexes I and II of NAFTA allow governments to select sectors in which they reserve the right not to provide National Treatment or MFN Treatment. All three NAFTA signatories took advantage of these clauses, exempting industries such as atomic energy, the extraction, transport or processing of petroleum, gas, uranium and certain other minerals, aviation, shipping transport, trucking, telecommunications, media ownership, social services provision (e.g. law enforcement and correctional services), legal services, minority affairs, education, and fisheries. The Canadian government claimed that the ban was motivated by health risks associated with manganese emissions as well as air quality concerns due to damage MMT might cause to the catalytic converters in cars. Canada also noted that MMT use in unleaded petrol was banned in much of the U.S. as well as in parts of Europe. (The U.S. EPA initially banned the sale of MMT but was forced to allow it by a domestic court ruling.) Canada's ban of import and transport of MMT, rather than use, weakened the government's position. Allegedly, Canada's own laws prevented it from banning MMT use because the responsible government agencies had found insufficient evidence of either the claimed environmental or health effects.
Case Summaries
Ethyl submitted a claim for $251 million to an UNCITRAL panel. Anticipating that the panel was likely to find against it, in July 1998 the Canadian government reversed the ban on MMT import and transport, paid Ethyl $13 million in legal fees and damages, and signed a letter stating that MMT is not known to be hazardous and does not impair motor vehicle function. Award dismissing all of Methanex's claims. The Tribunal dismissed the expropriation claim on the grounds that the MTBE ban was the result of due process and for the public good: "...as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alia, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable..." (UNCITRAL Tribunal, p. 278).
Metalclad
This language indicates that a police powers carve-out is consistent with NAFTA's Chapter 11, at least in the eyes of this particular tribunal. to growing public opposition to the Glamis Imperial project, the then Governor Grey Davis explicitly stated that the regulations would essentially stop the project. Glamis claims damages of not less than $50 million, which it states is below the projected value of the investment. The U.S. defense claims that even without the actions of the Californian government, the project was uneconomic.
The case has not yet gone before the Tribunal.
The model
We develop a two-stage model of environmental regulation and investment in the presence of a pre-existing international investment agreement (IIA). In the first stage the host and the investor determine the size of T , the tax payment the source will make to the host conditional on the host doing nothing later that decreases the value of the project for the investor. The parties take as given the terms of the IIA, including the size of any police powers carve-out, and any other investment clauses such as National Treatment. The host's ability to reject a project may be constrained by a right to establishment requirement in the treaty; the investor has no such constraint.
The project might result in environmental damages of fixed magnitude H, a measure of a project's riskiness. In the first stage, the host and the investor have identical information concerning the probability distribution for this random event, and both agents are risk neutral.
In the second stage the host obtains information about the probability of environmental harm; this information is not verifiable by the court. 3 The host has three choices: (a) do not regulate, and suffer the possible environmental harm; (b) regulate, thereby avoiding the environmental harm, and reimburse the investor for the amount of the investment; or (c) regulate (avoiding the possible harm) and claim the police powers justification. The third action triggers an investor complaint to the international tribunal. Defending against this complaint is always costly to the host. We assume that if the host loses the litigation, it is unable to recontract with the investor.
3 A multiperiod generalization of this model would allow the host to decide when to regulate. Even in this case it would, in general, not be optimal for the host to wait until it had perfect information about the environmental harm. Our model captures in a simple manner the idea that the host sometimes wants to impose regulations even before it is certain about damages in the unregulated state.
The second stage decision problem for the host
The first stage agreement stipulates that the host receives T in present discounted value of tax revenue, provided the host does nothing to diminish the investor's payoff. In the second period, the host decides whether to regulate. The purpose of the regulation might be to achieve an environmental objective that falls within the scope of the police powers carve-out, or it might be a means of disguised expropriation.
The standard definition of expropriation in international law requires that the host gain something from the allegedly expropriatory action. We define R as the expected value of residual benefits, excluding compensation payments, to the host from regulation. R is observable only to the host. In a traditional expropriation case, R represents the value to the host of the plant or property taken from the foreign investor. However, in the context of regulatory takings, it is a matter of debate whether the host must directly benefit from an action before that action can be labeled expropriation. Indeed, it is arguable whether any of the host governments actually benefited directly from first allowing and then expropriating the investments in the cases described in Section 2. The Glamis Gold case provides probably the best example of government gain. One could argue that, through the permitting process, U.S. governments at various levels sold to Glamis the right to remove the gold from U.S. soil. Then the Californian backfilling regulations took that right away. The end result was that the U.S. retained both the gold and the money from the sale of the mining claims. In light of the uncertainty whether a host must gain in order for an action to be deemed expropriation, we include R in our model, but none of our results rely on R being positive. When R > T the host has an incentive to expropriate, creating a hold-up problem. If instead R is small, there is no holdup problem;
however the lack of cost-internalization may still induce excessive regulation and therefore be globally inefficient.
In the interest of simplicity, we assume the investor loses the entire value of the investment if regulated.
stage is a random variable with expected value π. The expected value to the investor of the unregulated project is π − T . The value of π is learned in the second stage, and is not verifiable by the court, so the court cannot use it to calculate compensation. The investor can run the project more efficiently than the host (π > R), so transfer of ownership is never efficient for society.
It is common knowledge that the investment might cause environmental harm of magnitude H. After the investment has been made, the host learns β, the probability that this harm will actually occur (0 ≤ β ≤ 1); β is private information, and is uncorrelated with the stream of future profits, π. After learning β, the host takes one of the three actions described above.
If the host decides to regulate without paying compensation, the investor files a complaint.
The tribunal imposes a test to determine whether the regulation falls within the scope of the police powers carve-out. Following the actual practice of NAFTA tribunals, e.g. in Metalclad v. United Mexican States, we assume the host must pay the investor compensation equal to K if the host fails the test. We assume that π − T − K > 0, i.e. the source's expected net return conditional on π and no regulation is positive.
In our setting the host has an unobservable incentive to use bogus environmental regulation as an indirect means of expropriation. The tribunal must use public details of the case to determine whether the regulation falls within the scope of the police powers carve-out, and is thus non-compensable. We assume that the tribunal's likeliness to accept the police powers carveout defense is greater the higher is β. That is, the stronger the private evidence of environmental risk, the more likely that the public record and the tribunal acknowledge this risk. We also assume that, for a given realization of β, the tribunal is less likely to rule in favor of the host the more narrowly the IIA defines the police powers carve-out. Let N measure the narrowness of the police powers carve-out; N is set exogenously by the terms of the IIA and by the body of international law. A larger value of N corresponds to a narrower police powers carve-out, i.e. a stricter burden of proof for the host. We formalize these concepts via the function P (β, N), defined as the probability the tribunal rules in favor of the host; the above assumptions imply ∂P/∂β > 0 while ∂P/∂N < 0.
In order to illustrate our main results concerning the efficient choice of N (in the following section), we use closed form expressions for the slopes of indifference curves. For this purpose, we adopt the specification
The parameter N measures the narrowness of the police powers carve-out: for N = 0 the host always wins arbitration, so there is no investor protection; as N → ∞ the host never wins, except in the limiting case where the host is certain that the project is harmful (β = 1).
The host always pays court costs C, which we take to be a constant. (Allowing C to be a non-decreasing function of N leads to uninteresting complications.) For simplicity, and to reflect the view that the variable legal costs are more onerous for the host, we ignore the investor's court costs.
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We assume that K is greater than each of C and R. The inequality K > C means that the host will litigate rather than voluntarily compensate the source if the host is certain of victory (i.e. if P = 1). K > R implies the host would not make the investment on its own, since the cost of the investment (K) exceeds the payoff of the host-run investment (R).
The second stage outcome
The host's and source's expected payoffs under the three possible host actions (associated with the letters "a, b, c" respectively) are:
We also studied a model with the following binomial structure. The tribunal accepts the police powers carveout defense if and only if the host's regulation passes N independent and simultaneous "trials." For example, the tribunal will simultaneously review whether the regulation was properly vetted with the scientific community, whether regulators were subject to undue influence from lobby groups, whether the investor was kept abreast of the policy process, and so on. Each trial might result in "pass" or "fail," i.e. the regulation was properly vetted or not. Let p be the probability that a trial results in pass when the project is harmful, and q ∈ (0, p) be the probability that the trial results in pass when the project is not harmful. The host's subjective probability that the project is harmful is β, so its subjective probability of passing the test is P (β, N ) = βp N + (1 − β) q N . This alternative formulation leads to the same qualitative results as described in this section of the paper. However, this alternative does not produce closed form expressions for the slopes of indifference curves, needed for the following section. 
For example, when the realization of β is greater than threshold value β 1 , the host will prefer to regulate and go to arbitration rather than to regulate and settle directly.
The value of T at which β 1 = β 2 = β 3 is
T is a threshold tax level beyond which the host is unwilling to regulate and settle directly. For a given realization of β, the higher is the tax level the greater the host's expected payoff from not regulating. Once T exceeds the threshold valueT , the host will never forgo its tax revenues in favor of regulation unless it also thinks that the probability of harm is high enough to make defending its case before a tribunal preferable to paying compensation outright.
The following proposition uses the above definitions to identify the host's optimal second stage actions contingent on the realization of β. 
Proposition 1 In the regulation stage (second period), the host's optimal action depends on the realization of β.
• If T ∈ [0,T ) then β 3 < β 2 < β 1 and the host will: regulate and litigate if β > β 1 ; regulate and directly compensate if β ∈ (β 3 , β 1 ); not regulate if β < β 3 .
• If T ≥T then β 1 ≤ β 2 ≤ β 3 and the host will: regulate and litigate if β > β 2 ; not regulate if β < β 2 ; never directly compensate. Table 1 .
The graphs of β 2 and β 3 are increasing in T , while β 1 is independent of T , and the three graphs intersect at the same point.T > 0 if and only if
Inequality (3) shows that the judicial test must be sufficiently strict in order for the host to prefer paying compensation rather than litigating, given that it is optimal to regulate.
Comparative statics of an increase in N For N sufficiently close to 0 (where β 1 andT are negative), the court almost always finds in favor of the host. In this case the host regulates for all values of β whenever its tax revenue, T , is less than the benefit of regulation minus the litigation costs, R − C. For large β this regulation achieves an environmental goal, and for small β the regulation is merely disguised expropriation. The absence of a strict burden of proof for the police powers carve-out creates a hold-up problem at the investment stage, because the investor knows that the host will have an incentive to expropriate at a later stage.
IfT > 0, as in Figure 1 , an increase in N decreases the region (labelled 'c') in (T, β)
space where the host decides to litigate; the increase in N expands both the region in which the host decides to regulate and compensate ('b'), and the region in which the host decides not to regulate ('a').
For simplicity, we assume hereafter that the probability distribution for β does not have a mass point at β = 1. With this assumption, the probability that the host will litigate when N = ∞ is 0. As N becomes large, the host has negligible chance of prevailing in court. As N → ∞, β 1 → 1. In this limiting case, corresponding to no police powers carve-out, the host pays compensation if β > β 3 , and otherwise refrains from regulating.
Social inefficiency There are two sources of inefficiency at this stage of the model. The first is that the host sometimes litigates, incurring socially wasteful court costs C. If this were the only source of inefficiency, it could be made negligible by choosing N sufficiently large, so that the host never litigates.
However, even when N = ∞, inefficiency persists if the required compensation, K, is less than the investor's lost profits, π − T . In this case, the host does not fully compensate the investor, and therefore does not fully internalize the cost of regulation; this is true even if R is zero. The host regulates if and only if R − K > T − βH, i.e. when βH > T + K − R.
In contrast, the socially efficient program requires regulation if and only if joint welfare with regulation, R, exceeds joint welfare without regulation, π − βH. Regulation is efficient ex post if and only if βH > π − R. Provided that the host has positive expected profits (π > T + K), the socially optimal minimal value of β that triggers regulation is strictly higher than the value of β above which the host regulates. In this sense, the host regulates too often.
Second period equity For N sufficiently large, there are combinations of β and T for which the host's second-period expected payoff is negative. In these cases, the host is worse off than if it had never accepted the project. Equity concerns may make this kind of outcome unattractive.
A smaller value of N (i.e., a broader police powers carve-out) would address these concerns.
The investment stage
During the first stage, the host and source determine the size of the tax payment T and the investor decides whether to undertake the investment project. Depending on the details of the IIA, the host may also be able to veto the project. In this stage, actors take the breadth of the police powers carve-out as pre-determined. They also take as given other clauses in the IIA, notably National Treatment and rules granting right of establishment.
An outcome to the first stage is a pair (T, N). We examine the equity, efficiency and investment implications of a variety of outcomes. In particular, we show that IIAs with high N may discourage investment and may be inequitable. We begin by calculating each agent's first stage (ex ante) expected welfare conditional on the project proceeding. We then turn to the equity and efficiency of an outcome. A numerical example closes the section.
Ex ante expected welfare
The channel through which the host extracts T from foreign investors merits further discussion.
If the IIA allows the host to demand side payments for access to its market, then T would include the value of those payments, in addition to the present value of future taxes. An IIA that contains a right of establishment clause prohibits these side payments, making it more difficult for the host to extract rent from the investor in the pre-investment stage. This limit on the host's bargaining power benefits the investor. The host might also benefit from this prohibition, because it decreases the scope for bribing corrupt officials (Markusen 2001) .
We assume that the host is not able to demand a side payment as a condition for investment.
Thus, T consists only of revenues collected from foreign-owned enterprizes during general taxation. This limitation is the key to our results. National Treatment clauses stipulate that governments may not treat the investments of foreigners less favorably than those of citizens. In terms of general profit taxes, governments may not charge foreigners a higher tax rate. With this in mind, let t d define the host's optimal domestic tax rate. If the tax rate t necessary to deliver T from the potential project is less than t d , then the National Treatment clause does not prevent the host from obtaining T . the National Treatment clause, unless it increases the domestic tax rate above its optimal level.
Standard tax considerations and the theory of the excess burden of taxation explain why raising taxes above t d imposes costs on the host, regardless of whether the host eventually regulates the foreign-owned project.
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We use a reduced form model of the excess burden from domestic taxation. We assume that domestic and foreign investment markets are independent, and denote the deadweight loss from excessive taxation in the domestic market by D(T ). We now describe the host and foreign investor's ex ante expected welfare as a function of (T, N). Both agents have rational expectations regarding the host's second-stage decision; they understand how this decision depends on (T, N) and the realization of β. Both agents' subjective probability distribution for β is uniform over [0, 1] . The discount factor is set equal to one and we assume that π is independent of β.
Some investor-to-state disputes are settled even before arbitration is launched ((UNCTAD)
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2005). We therefore restrict our analysis to the most interesting case, where there are realizitions of β for which the host wants to take any of the three possible second-stage actions. From equation (2), this possibility requires that T <T . We define an additional variable,T ≡ R+π 2 − K, whose role will be apparent in Lemma 1 below. In the interest of brevity we restrict our attention to taxes satisfying
T ). This interval is independent of the deadweight loss function D(T ). This fact is
9 If the elasticities of supply of foreign and domestic investment differ, the host has an economic reason for imposing different taxes on the two types of investment; there may also be positive externalities associated with domestic investment. In general, the optimal tax (from the standpoint of the host) levied on domestic investment may be lower than the optimal tax levied on foreign investment. 10 The MFN principle might similarly generate deadweight loss. The host's share of any such loss can be incorporated into D(T ). 11 The host can use T to reduce the need for domestic taxation, so in a full model of international taxation, t d and T are not independent. In order to keep the model simple, we ignore these kinds of interactions.
important because it means that there always exists a function D(T ) for which the conditions in the lemmas and propositions below are satisfied, so the results are not vacuous. 
and the ex ante expected payoff, E(W S ), for the source from investing K is
Efficiency
In order to determine the shape of the respective indifference curves in (T, N) space, we first collect the partial derivatives of E(W H ) and E(W S ) in Table 2 , using the definition α = 1 + ln K − ln C. Using these derivatives, the slope of the host's indifference curve is
and the slope of the source's indifference curve is
The shape of the indifference curves depends on the following conditions. Next we consider the convexity of agents' preferences.
Lemma 2 The source has convex preferences over T and N when conditions C1 and C3 hold.
The host has convex preferences over T and N when conditions C1, C2, and C4 hold.
Convexity of the host's preferred set is equivalent to concavity of the host's indifference curve (N as a function of T ). Convexity of the host's preferred set requires that D 00 is sufficiently large. When D 00 ≈ 0, condition C4 is violated and the host's preference set is not convex. Moreover, equations (6) and (7) imply that for D 0 ≈ 0 the host's indifference curve is steeper than the source's. In this case, any outcome (T, N) with T <T and finite N is inefficient: the host and source would both benefit from a narrower carve-out and a correspondingly larger transfer T to the host. Proposition (2) assumes that T <T . Appendix B shows that outcomes with finite N are also inefficient when T ≥T if D 0 ≈ 0. These results imply that a (vanishingly) narrow police powers carve-out is necessary for efficiency when
there is only negligible inefficiency at the investment stage, a broad police powers carve-out is inefficient. In our model with symmetric first-stage information and risk neutral agents, this leaves only the second-stage inefficiencies-the hold-up and cost-internalization problemsfor which a strict rule regarding expropriation and compensation is an appropriate solution.
Now we consider cases where tax distortion is non-negligible and a National Treatment clause limits a host's ability to obtain sufficient compensation for bearing all the post-investment risk. In this case, N < ∞ is efficient, while a narrow police powers carve-out might limit investment and also be inequitable. In order to make the point simply, we continue to assume T <T . 12 We begin by showing that the contract curve is vertical when conditions C1-C4 all hold.
Proposition 3 When conditions C1, C2, C3, and C4 hold, the host's and source's indifference
curves are tangent at a unique tax rate T * . The contract curve consists of a vertical segment (
The proof contains the implicit equation that determines the value of T * . Proposition 3 provides sufficient conditions for tangency of the source's and host's indifference curves at interior values of N . Importantly, pairs (T, N) along the resulting contract curve are locally efficient. In short, when there is a non-trivial bargaining inefficiency, a broad police powers carve-out can be locally efficient. Convexity of the preference sets is guaranteed only for a subset of the relevant choice set, so we cannot establish global efficiency.
12 Even though T is a choice variable, restricting it's range is valid: certain parameter and functional form restrictions imply T <T in any sensible agreement. For example, if we restrict parameter values such that
Since no sensible contract will specify a transfer payment that hurts both the source and the host, contracts with T ≥T will not be viable.
The contract curve is a vertical segment at a unique transfer payment T * . The uniqueness of T * means it is not possible to raise the source's welfare by raising N and still compensate the host for bearing more of the ex post risk associated with investment. Instead, a larger value of N (together with an efficient tax T * ) represents a transfer of welfare from the host to the investor. In this situation, the claim that a strict interpretation of Chapter 11's expropriation clause benefits investors at the expense of host nations is correct. Moreover, as we show below, under some circumstances IIAs with high Ns can also inhibit investment.
Investment
In the second stage, after the investment has been sunk, the project might produce negative expected benefits to either the host or the investor. In the first stage, the investor has the option of walking away from the project, so the investor's ex ante expectation of its benefit from the project is non-negative in any first stage equilibrium. The host would like to reject projects that generate negative expected benefits, but its ability to do so depends on the terms of the IIA.
To see how a narrow police powers carve-out may reduce investment, consider the case where the IIA and judicial interpretation lead to a narrow police powers carve-out (large N), a project is risky (large H), and the marginal deadweight loss, D 0 is large. In this situation the host requires a large compensation (T − D(T )) in order to benefit from the project, i.e. in order that E(W H ) ≥ 0. If the host is able to reject projects, the narrow police powers carve-out may result in the rejection of (potentially) mutually beneficial projects. If the host cannot reject projects, the narrow police powers carve-out can lead to expected losses for the host.
For example, suppose that the source has all of the bargaining power, and the host must receive expected welfare no less than that associated with the indifference curve labeled W in Figure 2 (i.e. the host has some ability to reject projects). If the source could choose both T and N, the outcome would be T * and N * (where the source's indifference curve S * is tangent to the host's participation constraint, W ). However, if N is set exogenously atN > N * , then the source needs to offer the hostT , the level that satisfies the host's participation constraint.
AtN,T , the source obtains a level of welfare given by the indifference curveŜ. If this welfare level is below the source's reservation level, the host and source will be unable to arrive at a mutually beneficial agreement regarding the terms of investment.
Another possibility (not drawn) is that N is predetermined at a level N 1 so high that there is no value of T that can guarantee the host non-negative expected welfare, so the host rejects the project. This is possible when condition C2 is violated, i.e. when the marginal tax distortion is so large that, at high T , it swamps any direct expected benefits from the project.
Most IIAs provide only weak rights to invest and hosts are able to reject unattractive projects.
For these agreements, the greater regulatory risk caused by a narrow police powers carve-out might lead hosts to reject many projects, reducing the equilibrium level of FDI. NAFTA is more complicated. Rights of establishment and acquisition are included in the MFN and National Treatment clauses, making it difficult for the host to reject risky investments. NAFTA hosts may have to accept projects that they expect will not be beneficial for them. However, NAFTA signatories had the option to exempt entire sectors from the MFN and National Treatment clauses. To the extent that the signatories were able to anticipate (at the time of signing) which sectors would be risky, they do not need to accept projects with negative expected benefits. However, exempting these sectors means that they enjoy none of the positive effects of the agreement (increased security and transparency).
A numerical example
Here we provide a numerical example of the impact that a strict expropriation clause may have in the context of an IIA with weak rights to invest: the project is rejected by the host when N is high, but accepted by both host and source when N is lowered sufficiently. 
Conclusion
A narrow police powers carve-out to the expropriation clause in NAFTA's Chapter 11 can promote investment by helping to overcome the hold-up problem and the tendency of governments not to internalize regulatory costs. Some argue that governments should be exempt from paying compensation for regulations that serve a legitimate public purpose and that are non-discriminatory. Most NAFTA tribunals have been sympathetic to such concerns and have applied a police powers carve-out to expropriation.
We used a simple model to analyze the efficiency and equity implications of a police powers carve-out, given the presence of non-discrimination rules. A police powers carve-out creates two inefficiencies during the post-investment (regulation) stage. First, when parties can dispute whether a regulation is legitimate, a carve-out may encourage costly litigation. Second, a positive probability of a tribunal exempting the regulator from paying compensation encourages the host to regulate more often than is warranted from a joint welfare perspective. Both of these inefficiencies stem from moral hazard. If these are the only inefficiencies in the investment game, then there is no role for a police powers carve-out. It is Pareto efficient to adopt a narrow police powers carve-out, and use taxes that are set prior to investment to compensate the host country for the increased regulatory risk.
However most modern investment treaties also potentially generate inefficiency at the stage when the terms of the investment are determined. For example, the National Treatment principle requires the host to treat foreign investors no less favorably than domestic investors. A host government cannot demand side payments from foreign investors, nor can it charge them higher tax rates. This aspect of National Treatment can create inefficiencies when the investment project is environmentally risky. In order to be willing to accept a risky project while surrendering the right to regulate the project without paying compensation, the host may need a significant payment from the investor. The host may be unable to obtain this payment and still comply with the National Treatment clause, unless it imposes an inefficiently high tax on domestic investment.
Distortions associated with non-discrimination clauses are central in our analysis. We identified conditions under which this first stage inefficiency dominates the moral hazard problems surrounding regulation. When the tax distortion is sufficiently important, a range of police powers carve-outs are all Pareto-efficient. A narrow carve-out might simply transfer rent from the host government to foreign investors.
We provided an example in which narrowing the police powers carve-out can reduce investment when signatories do not have a strong right of establishment. Even in NAFTA (which does give a such a right) parties were able to select which sectors to exempt from aspects of the treaty. When hosts can reject projects, investments must satisfy a participation constraint for both the host and the investor. If the police powers carve-out to the expropriation clause is narrow, the host requires a large payment to accept risky projects. In some cases, there may be no outcome that satisfies both parties' participation constraints. In such a case, a broader police powers carve-out would increase the range of mutually beneficial investment opportunities. A narrow police powers carve-out might inhibit rather than encourage FDI.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The relation i ≺ j means that action j gives the host a higher payoff than action i. By Table 1 . Provided the probability distribution for β does not have a mass point at one of the critical values, we do not need to specify which action the host will take when indifferent between two options.
Proof of Lemma 1 When condition C1 holds, E(W H ) and E(W S ) are as given by equations (4) and (5) and the corresponding partial derivatives are as given in Table 2 . Using values found in Table 2 , we see that dE(W H )/dT > 0 if and only if C2 holds. The maintained assumption K > C implies that αC < K which in turn implies that dE(W H )/dN is negative. Thus, conditional on C1,
is positive if and only if C2 holds.
Condition C3 is necessary and sufficient for dE(W S )/dT > 0. Our maintained assumption
> 0 if and only if C3
holds.
Proof of Lemma 2 Condition C1 implies E(W H ) and E(W S ) are given by equations (4) and (5) respectively and the corresponding partial derivatives are as given in Table 2 . From Table   2 , the cross partial derivatives of both welfare functions are 0, so the functions are additively separable in T, N. For both agents, we can write expected utility as G(T ) + F (N). Of course, the functions are different for the two agents, but to conserve notation we avoid subscripts. For the host, G 0 > 0, F 0 < 0 and these inequalities are reversed for the source. It is easy to show that the formula for the second derivative of an indifference curve is
Using Table 2 , for the source, we have Table A1 . First and Second derivatives of source welfare Given our maintained assumption that K > C, we see from Table A1 that for the source F 0 > 0. Thus the cubic that multiplies the large parentheses in equation (8) is positive, so the sign of
dT 2 is the same as the sign of
e can also see from Table A1 that F 00 and G 00 are always negative. Since (G 0 ) 2 is always positive, condition C1 is sufficient to ensure that d 2 N dT 2 > 0 for the source. As shown in the proof of Lemma 1, given C1 holds, condition C3 is necessary and sufficient to ensure that the source's welfare is increasing as N becomes larger and T becomes smaller. Thus the source's preferred sets are convex when C1 and C3 hold.
The first and second derivatives of the host's welfare are Table A2 . First and Second derivatives of host welfare
Since (for the host) F 0 < 0, the cubic that multiplies the large parentheses in equation (8) is negative. Thus the sign of
All the terms in equation (9) < 0 and
dT 2 > 0. Thus with reference to Lemma 1 we see that convexity requires that either both C2 and C4 hold, or that neither hold.
Proof of Proposition 2 Condition C1 implies E(W H ) and E(W S ) are as given by (4) Proof of Proposition 3 Condition C1 implies E(W H ) and E(W S ) are as given by (4) and (5). When conditions C1-C4 hold, the indifference curves slope upward and each agents' preferred set is convex. Under these conditions, the contract curve is the set of points in the T, N plane on which the indifference curves are tangent. The slopes of both indifference curves are proportional to N 2 , implying that the contract curve is independent of N; that is, the contract curve is vertical at the unique tax, denoted T * , at which the slopes in equations (6) and (7) are equal to each other. The equation for T * is:
As noted above, points along the vertical line at T * form the contract curve only if preferences are convex. From Lemma 2, conditions C1, C2 and C4 jointly guarantee a convex preferred set for the host. From Table 3 we see that condition C4 requires N < 
